Strategic Make-or-Buy Decisions: The $\frac{M}{o}$ –Tool

Robert A. GOEHLICH¹

European Business School, Oestrich-Winkel, Germany

Abstract: Real world outsourcing decisions are very seldom based on a sound trade-off of risks, costs that these risks impose and benefits. The present paper attempts to overcome some of these shortcomings by developing a make-or-buy decisionsupporting tool entitled "MoB-Tool". The tool allows one to determine what organizational architecture is best suited to a specified activity. About 50 propositions of make-or-buy decisions, mostly gained from secondary analysis, are collected and ranked. Those propositions are systematically connected to 6 strategic objectives, 3 organizational characteristics, 4 product characteristics and 3 environmental characteristics. The tool helps decisionmakers generate a transparent and strategy-oriented solution with fair attention to all important considerations. By contrast, the less structured intuitive approach allows the decision-maker to weigh only a few arguments simultaneously – typically those which have current subjective importance for the decider. Due to the modularity of this tool, it can be extended easily to additional ob-

¹Alumni of European Business School, International University Schloss Reichartshausen, Department Law, Governance & Economics, Rheingaustrasse 1, 65375 Oestrich-Winkel, Germany, Mobile: +49-(0)174-25-313-87, email: robert@goehlich.com, Internet: www.goehlich.com

jectives and characteristics, e.g., those one that representing sustainable development aspects.

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JEL Classification: C72, L22, L25, L93, D23, M55, Q01

1 Introduction

A company has many architectural choices from which to produce its products or services (Figure 1). At one extreme, the product or service can be purchased from any supplier in the spot market. At the other extreme, the company can produce the product or service internally within a division. Between the extremes are various long-term contracts, such as strategic alliances, franchise agreements, lease contracts, joint ventures and supply contracts (Brickley, Smith & Zimmerman, 2006).



Figure 1: Illustration of Organizational Architectures

Current theories indicate why, when stressing efficiency gains in terms of transaction and production costs, certain activities might best be suited for outsourcing; while other theories show that particular activities, e.g., core competencies, are more efficient when vertically integrated. However, real-world outsourcing decisions are seldom based on the sound trade-off of risk, on the costs imposed and the potential benefits of these risks. One reason for this is the overwhelming supply of theories, each one concentrating on a single aspect of the problem and therefore complicating the decision-making process for managers. Thus, there is a need for a process that (Figure 2): (1) is simple to apply for managers; (2) encompasses the various predictions that are typically tested in isolation by researchers in the empirical literature; and (3) allows significant conclusions to be drawn that are aligned with extant theories related to the make-or-buy decision. This vision is realized by the development of the MoB-Tool described in this paper.

The study is structured as follows. In the next section, the process is introduced, the literature is qualitatively reviewed by presenting the pros and cons concerning vertical integration and outsourcing, and the resulting decision-supporting tool entitled "MoB-Tool" is shown. Finally, section three offers a comparison with other studies and a discussion on the limitations.





2 The Process

2.1 General

The make-or-buy decision-supporting process is structured as shown in Figure 3 and comprises four sub-modules. The submodule "Settings" is illustrated in detail in Figure 4. This module processes the input data of strategic objectives, organizational characteristics, product characteristics and environmental characteristics. The submodule "Integration Pros" processes the main advantages of vertical integration from the point of view of the final assembler (Figure 5), while the submodule "Outsourcing Pros" processes those advantages of outsourcing as shown in Figure 6. The submodule "Results" processes the output data as shown in Figure 7.



Figure 3: Overview of the Make-or-Buy Decision-supporting Process

Figure 4: Settings Submodule



| | | IN | FEGRATION PROS Submodule | | |
|-------|--|-------|--|-------|-------------------------------------|
| | Control Aspects | | Stability Aspects | С | oordination Aspects |
| In01 | Achieve easy monitor- ing of employee's effort | In07 | Reduce risk concerning quality | In16 | Improve price coordi- nation |
| In02 | Improve motivation by ownership effect | In08 | Increase reliability of receiving an input | In17 | Reduce taxes |
| In03' | Avoid high trading costs | In09 | Reduce poaching | In18' | Avoid double margin- alization |
| In04' | Reduce free-rider prob- lem | In10 | Increase foreclosure | In19' | Avoid high set-up costs |
| In05' | Avoid "Buy-in" hazard | Inll' | Avoid high competi- tiveness costs | In20' | Avoid difficulty to set incentives |
| In06' | Reduce compensation- related incentive to lease | In12' | Avoid expensive con- tracts | In21' | Avoid phantom limb pain |
| | | In13' | Reduce hold-up prob- lem | In22' | Avoid high transporta- tion cost |
| | | In14' | Avoid first-mover ad- vantage of supplier | | |
| | | In15' | Reduce culture risk | | |

Figure 5: Integration Pros Submodule

| | OUTSOURCING PROS Submodule | |
|---|--|--|
| Control Aspects | Stability Aspects | Coordination Aspects |
| Out01 Achieve high-powered incentives | Out04 Achieve spreading of risk | Out10 Increase sales |
| Out02'Avoid bureaucratic distortions | Out05 Avoid high cost of ownership transfer | Out11 Reduce labor costs |
| Out03'Avoid costly incentives for motivating effi. prod. | Out06 Deter market entry | Out12 Reduce careless activi- ties |
| | Out07 Achieve stable set of clients | Out13 Increase concentration on core competencies |
| | Out08 Achieve high program flexibility | Out14 Reduce levels of man- agement coordination |
| | Out09 Increase sharing of R&D costs | Out15'Avoid reduced initia- tive to invest |
| | | Out16'Avoid negative Net Present Value projects |
| | | Out17 Reduce production costs |
| | | Out18'Avoid insufficient volume |
| | | Out19 Increase bundling of knowledge |
| | | Out20 Achieve expanding resources |
| | | Out21 Gain access to benefits of partner's assets |
| | | Out22 Develop technical stan- dards |
| | | Out23'Avoid little learning effects |
| | | Out24 Attract higher-quality specialists |
| | | Out25 Achieve availability of better specialists |

Figure 6: Outsourcing Pros Submodule

Figure 7: Results Submodule



2.2 Qualitative Assessment

Table 1 shows an overview of the literature used for "Integration Pros" and "Outsourcing Pros" submodule propositions.

 Table 1: Literature Review for Vertical Integration (left) and Outsourc

ing (right)

| | | | _ | | |
|--------|--------|---|-------|---------|--|
| | ID | Reference | | ID | Reference |
| | In01 | Grossman and Helpman (2004), Anderson and Schmittlein | _ | Out01 | Holmstrom and Milgrom (1991), Gibbons (2005a), Grout (1984) |
| Ξ | | (1984) | Ĕ | Out02 | Havek (1945) McAfee and McMillan (1995) Milgrom (1988) |
| -s | In02 | Smith and Wakeman (1985), Holmstrom and Milgrom (1991) | - | | Downs (1966) Williamson (1967) Aoki (1988) Levine and |
| bec | In03 | Williamson (1985), Wilhelm (2001) | fire | | Twon (1900), Winnamson (1907), Hoki (1900), Levine and |
| As | In04 | - Defense Federal Association Regulation Supplement (2006) | - 0 | 0027 | Tysoli (1990) |
| trol | mos | Koalla (2003) Montavarda and Taaca (1982b) Defance Federal | _ | Outos | |
| , on | | Acquisition Regulation Supplement (2006) | 0 | Out04 | Burgers, Hill and Chan Kim (1993), Esty (2004) |
| \cup | In06' | Smith and Watts (1982) | - | Out05 | Smith and Wakeman (1985), Flath (1980) |
| | In07 | Grossman and Helpman (2002) Master (1988) Akerlof (1970) | Ë | , Out06 | Chen and Ross (2000) |
| | 11107 | Ouinn and Hilmer (1995) | ili | Out07 | Clemons and Hitt (1997) |
| | In08 | - | ital | Out08 | Bean (2003), Heinemann (2007) |
| | In09 | Klein, Crawford and Alchian (1978), Schumpeter (1989), | 0. | Out09 | Teece (1992), David (1985) |
| | | Malerba and Orsenigo (1995), Prahalad and Hamel (1990), | _ | Out10 | Frynas, Mellahi and Pigman (2006), Wessner (1999), MacPher- |
| | | Shinde (2007) | | | son and Pritchard (2002) |
| 5 | In10 | Hart et al. (1990) | | Out11 | MacPherson and Pritchard (2002) Engardio Bernstein and Kri- |
| 1 | In11' | Richardson (1993), Destefani (2004) | | 0 | nalani (2003) |
| cts | In12' | Hart (1995), Klein, Crawford and Alchian (1978), Parmigiani | | Out12 | Palain (2005) Debitrar and Teular (1001) Mahala (2001) |
| spe | | (2007), Destefani (2004), Crocker and Reynolds (1993), Federal | | Out12 | Contract Taylor (1991), Mainike (2001) |
| N N | | Acquisition Regulation (2005), Grossman and Hart (1986), Ar- | 4 | Out13 | Quinn, Doorley and Paquette (1990), Quinn and Hilmer (1995) |
| oilit | 1 101 | row (1969) | 1 | Out14 | Quinn and Hilmer (1995) |
| Stal | In13 | Hart (1995), Klein, Crawford and Alchian (1978), Holmstrom | StS | Out15' | Gibbons (2005a) |
| | | (1999), Latontaine and Stade (2007), Monteverde and Teece | Dec | Out16' | Jensen (1986) |
| | | (1982a), Quinn and Finner (1995), Outchi (1981), Fielde and John (1982) | As | Out17 | - |
| | In14' | Monteverde and Teece (1982a) Harrigan (1984) Goldstein | EO EO | Out18' | Berger and Ofek (1995), Berndt, Friedlaender and Wang Chiang |
| | 1111.4 | (2002) Pritchard (2001) Smith (2001) | ati | | (1990) |
| | In15' | Pennings (1994). Manabat (2003). Lafontaine and Slade (2007). | -ip | Out19 | Clemons and Hitt (1997) |
| | | Chen (2004) | 00 | Out20 | Ouinn and Hilmer (1995) |
| 0 | In16 | Carlton and Klamer (1983) | 0 | Out21 | Rowan (2004) Rothaermel Hitt and Jobe (2006) Smitka (1991) |
| = | In17 | Scholes et al. (2005), Majd and Myers (1987) | | Out22 | |
| ų. | In18' | Spengler (1950) | | Out22 | - Cressman and Halaman (2002) Neuror (1002) Istuin and Baua |
| atic | In19' | Richardson (1993) | | 00025 | -il (2004) |
| ili | In20' | Rowan (2004), Ng (2007) | | | nik (2004) |
| 100 | In21' | Mahnke (2001), Quinn and Hilmer (1995) | | Out24 | - |
| 0 | In22' | Ng (2007) | _ | Out25 | Domberger (1998), Mahnke (2001) |
| | | | | | |

For reader-friendly use, all information is prepared in the same format and shown by example in Figure 8. The full data sets are available upon request.

Figure 8: Example of a Vertical Integration Proposition

In21' Avoid phantom limb pain

<u>Description</u>: Lost interaction effects with outsourced activities (independently on their core or non-core status) can diminish the effectiveness of the remaining activities (Mahnke, 2001).

Example: Airlines outsourced the handling of passenger luggage at airports. Even though airlines try to offer the best service for their first class passengers, the passenger satisfaction can be strongly blurred by dirty, damaged, delayed or lost luggage.

<u>Solution</u>: The organization can ensure that its remaining employees interact closely with its outsourced activities (Quinn & Hilmer, 1995). Alternatively, the organization can handle the "loss" better by finding and implementing alternatives, if the process of outsourcing is slower.

2.3 Quantitative Assessment

For pre-assessment of approximately 50 propositions concerning outsourcing and vertical integration decisions two indicators are used, namely "potential" and "probability." The assessment of potential (What is the maximum positive, relative effect in terms of short-term profit, market share, etc., to the organization, when this circumstance occurs?) is measured on a five-point Likert-type (Babbie, 2000; Trochim, 2006) scale (+, ++, +++, +++++) wherein "+" represents a very poor proposition and "+++++" represents a very promising one. The assessment of the probability (How often does this circumstance occur?) is based on a five-point scale wherein "+" represents a proposition that very seldom occurs, and "+++++" represents a proposition that occurs very often. This pre-assessment method of propositions based on potential and probability, in general, is sufficiently reliable to preliminarily rank propositions. This ranking is helpful for accurate assessment, i.e., to spend relatively more time on significant propositions than on those ones with low potential and low probability.

Figure 9: Potential-probability Matrix for Vertical Integration (left) and Outsourcing (right)



Figure 9 shows the related potential-probability matrix for vertical integration and outsourcing. Propositions that are in the significant sector (marked in dark gray) of these matrices require special attention because they influence the make-or-buy decision more than the others. The philosophy of the potential-probability matrix is similar to the risk matrix. While the risk matrix is an effective tool used to guide the user to avoiding risks of high probability and high consequence (Alexander

| & Marshall, 2006), the potential-probability matrix illustrates the bene |
|--|
| fits of high potential and high probability. |

| Serial No. | | | Stra Obje | tegic ctives | | | Org Ch | aniza arac | ntion ter. | | Pro Char | duct acter | • | En Ch | iviron iaraci | ım. ter. | Sum |
|---|---|--|--|--|--|---|---|--|--|--|---|---|---|--|--|--|--|
| | Set01 Increase market share | Set02 Increase quality | Set03 Increase stability | Set04 Increase short-tem profit | Set05 Increase flexibility | Set06 Increase control | Set07 Organization size (high) | Set08 Technical experience (low) | Set09 Organizational skills (low) | Set10 Product complexity (high) | Set11 Asset specificity (high) | Set12 Strategic vulnerability (high) | Set13 Technology uncertainty (high) | Set14 Intensity of competition (high) | Set15 Market demand uncertainty (high) | Set16 Quality of business climate (low) | |
| In01 In02 In03, In04, In05, In06, | 0 5 0 0 0 0 | 8 5 2 8 0 | 2 5 0 2 5 0 | 2 8 8 5 5 | 0 0 5 0 8 2 | 8 0 0 2 8 5 | 8 0 0 8 0 0 | | | 5 0 0 0 2 0 | 0 0 8 0 8 0 | 8 2 0 5 8 0 | 2 0 0 0 8 0 | | 0 0 8 0 2 0 | 8 0 8 0 0 0 | 51 25 39 33 54 12 |
| In07 In07 In08 In09 In10 In11 In12 In13 In14 In15, | 0 0 5 8 0 0 0 5 0 | 8 0 0 0 0 5 5 0 0 | 8 8 8 8 0 8 8 8 8 5 | 2 0 2 5 2 5 5 5 5 0 | 2 0 8 0 5 8 5 8 5 8 5 0 | 0 2 2 8 0 8 5 8 8 | 0 0 0 8 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 | 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 | 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 | 8 5 0 0 2 5 0 2 | 0 8 8 2 2 8 8 0 5 | 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 | 0 0 2 0 5 5 0 5 2 | 0 0 5 8 0 0 0 8 0 | 0 0 0 2 0 8 0 0 0 0 | 8 8 8 0 5 8 5 8 8 8 | $ \begin{array}{r} 12 \\ 42 \\ 47 \\ 48 \\ 62 \\ 24 \\ 70 \\ 57 \\ 60 \\ 40 \\ \end{array} $ |
| In16 In16 In17 In18, In19, In20, In21, In22, Sum | | 0 0 0 0 2 0 0 0 43 | 2 0 0 0 2 0 79 | 8 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 100 | 2 0 0 2 0 0 2 60 | 5 0 2 5 0 0 76 | 8 8 5 0 0 0 8 55 | 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 | 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 | 0 0 5 2 2 5 5 5 48 | 0 0 2 5 0 5 2 71 | 5 0 0 5 0 5 0 104 | 0 0 8 0 0 0 0 37 | 5 0 2 0 0 0 0 0 28 | 8 0 5 0 0 0 33 | 0 0 0 8 0 0 0 0 82 | 45 13 19 42 14 22 22 841 |

| | Table | 2: | Integration | Pros | Submod | ule |
|--|-------|----|-------------|------|--------|-----|
|--|-------|----|-------------|------|--------|-----|

Note: Benefit that proposition "Inxx" has on item "Setyy"? Scale: 0 = no effect; 1-3 = low effect; 4-6 = medium effect; 7-9 = high effect; 10 = 100% effect

For detailed assessment, a pairwise comparison (see Grob, 1984) is used to support the subjective-based assessment. This is a first

approach method given uncertainty in a situation, where detailed studies are not yet been performed. The pairwise comparison method is a powerful tool that allows the researcher to perform a fair and comprehensive transparent ranking of criteria; it allows ranking and assessment of the relative weight of each proposition to be determined.

However, results of pairwise comparisons must be checked for plausibility. Therefore, the relative benefit on each item of the "Settings" submodule that is gained from the propositions of the "Integration Pros" and "Outsourcing Pros" submodules are adjusted. All results for vertical integration and outsourcing are incorporated in the input mask of the "Integration Pros" (Table 2) and "Outsourcing Pros" submodule.

2.4 **Results**

The make-or-buy decision-supporting process is structured in five phases (Phase 1: Define Mission Statement, Phase 2: Define Strategic Objectives and Independent Factors, Phase 3: Define Weighting of Factors, Phase 4: Check Plausibility of Integration Pros and Outsourcing Pros Submodules, and Phase 5: Obtain Results) and can be applied to various challenging cases. For this, I develop a tool entitled "MoB-Tool," as shown in Figure 10-15.

Figure 10: Phase 1: Define Mission Statement



Figure 11: Phase 2: Define Strategic Objectives and Independent Fact.

| | Phase 2: Define Strategic Objectives an | d Inde | epende | nt Fac | tors (| SETTL | NGS S | Submo | dule) | | | | | | | | | |
|--|--|-----------------------------|------------------------|--------------------------|----------------------------------|----------------------------|------------------------|--------------------------------|----------------------------------|-----------------------------------|---------------------------------|--------------------------------|--------------------------------------|-------------------------------------|---------------------------------------|--|---|--|
| | Help: The strategic objectives using the mission statement as a guide (profitability, market share, quality, cost, flexibility, dependability, innovation, etc.) need be defined for each case study. In addition, the quasi independent factors, such as organization, product and environment characteristics need also be classified in this table. | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| | Data: | | Stra | ategic (| Object | tives | | Organ | ization | Char. | | Produc | t Char | _ | Enviro | nment | Char. | |
| | Jan. | Set01 Increase market share | Set02 Increase quality | Set03 Increase stability | Set04 Increase short-term profit | Set05 Increase flexibility | Set06 Increase control | Set07 Organization size (high) | Set08 Technical experience (low) | Set09 Organizational skills (low) | Set10 Product complexity (high) | Set11 Asset specificity (high) | Set12 Strategic vulnerability (high) | Set13 Technology uncertainty (high) | Set14 Intensity of competition (high) | Set15 Market demand uncertainty (high) | Set16 Quality of business climate (low) | |
| | (A) Copy machine usage (as reference) | 1 | 1 | 1 | 2 | 4 | 0 | 8 | 10 | 10 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 2 | 10 | 2 | 5 | |
| New Content of the second seco | (B) Aircraft final assembly production | 10 | 7 | 7 | 10 | 7 | 10 | 8 | 2 | 2 | 5 | 7 | 7 | 2 | 9 | 2 | 5 | |
| TTY III FILLER SALES | (C) Satellite rocket launch operation | 10 | 10 | 7 | 7 | 5 | 10 | 8 | 4 | 6 | 10 | 10 | 8 | 4 | 8 | 4 | 5 | |
| | (D) Space tourism rocket development | 10 | 10 | 2 | 2 | 5 | 5 | 8 | 9 | 8 | 6 | 6 | 2 | 9 | 2 | 10 | 5 | |
| | Test integration Scale: 0 = very low; 1-3 = low; 4-6 = mee | 0 lium; 1 | 10 7-9 = h | 10 igh; 10 | 0 = ver | 10 y high | 10 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 10 | 10 | 10 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 10 | |
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |



Figure 12: Phase 3: Define Weighting of Factors

Figure 13: Phase 4: Check Plausibility

| Mail: Hand | Phas | e 4: Check Plausibility (INTEGR. | 4 <i>TION</i> | PROS | s Subn | nodule | and C | OUTSC | OURCI | ING P. | ROS S | ubmo | dule) | | | | | | |
|--|---------|--|---|---------------------------------------|--|-------------------------------------|-------------------------------|-----------------------------|--------------------------------|----------------------------------|-----------------------------------|---------------------------------|--------------------------------|--------------------------------------|-------------------------------------|---------------------------------------|--|---|-----|
| | Help | This is a make-or-buy decision: "Outsourcing Pros" submodules in this aerospace-specific data for me that proposition "Inxx" or "Outxx" | -suppor is from on-aero has or | ting p the ac space i item ' | rocess erospac sector "Setyy" | applie se sect s, but s ?? | ed to for point results | aerosp nt of v should | ace. T iew. If 1 be an | Thus, a Tho be nalyzed | issessr tter va l carefi | nent d lues a illy. Q | lone to re avai Juestion | creat lable, 1 to co | e "Int it may mplete | egratio be po e the ta | n Pros ssible bles: F | " and to use Benefit | |
| Indeanan I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I | Data | : | | Stra | ategic | Object | ives | | Organ | izatior | h Char. | | Produc | t Char | | Enviro | onment | Char. | Sum |
| | Aspects | | Set01 Increase market share | Set02 Increase quality | Set03 Increase stability | Set04 Increase short-term profit | Set05 Increase flexibility | Set06 Increase control | Set07 Organization size (high) | Set08 Technical experience (low) | Set09 Organizational skills (low) | Set10 Product complexity (high) | Set11 Asset specificity (high) | Set12 Strategic vulnerability (high) | Set13 Technology uncertainty (high) | Set14 Intensity of competition (high) | Set15 Market demand uncertainty (high) | Set16 Quality of business climate (low) | |
| | | In01 | 0 | 8 | 2 | 2 | 0 | 8 | 8 | 0 | 0 | 5 | 0 | 8 | 2 | 0 | 0 | 8 | 51 |
| | - | In02 | 5 | 5 | 5 | 8 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 2 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 25 |
| | ntic | In03° | 0 | 2 | 0 | 8 | 5 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 8 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 8 | 8 | 39 |
| INTERN ISSUE INTERNATION | Co | In04° | 0 | 8 | 2 | 8 | 0 | 2 | 8 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 5 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 33 |
| The second state | | In05° | 0 | 0 | 5 | 5 | 8 | 8 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 2 | 8 | 8 | 8 | 0 | 2 | 0 | 54 |
| A CONTRACTOR OF THE OWNER | — | In06 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 5 | 2 | 5 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 12 |
| | | In07 | 0 | 8 | 8 | 2 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 8 | 0 | 8 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 8 | 42 |
| | | In08 | 0 | 0 | 8 | 0 | 8 | 2 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 5 | 8 | 8 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 8 | 47 |
| A REAL PROPERTY AND A REAL PROPERTY AND A REAL PROPERTY. | ~ | In09 | 5 | 0 | 8 | 2 | 0 | 2 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 8 | 8 | 2 | 5 | 0 | 8 | 48 |
| | llit | ln10 | 8 | 0 | 8 | 5 | 5 | 8 | 8 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 2 | 8 | 0 | 8 | 2 | 0 | 62 |
| | tabi | Inil' | 0 | 0 | 0 | 2 | 8 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 2 | 2 | 5 | 0 | 0 | 2 | 24 |
| The start of the second of the second s | ŝ | m12 | 0 | Ś | 8 | Ś | S | 8 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 2 | 8 | 8 | 2 | 0 | 8 | 8 | 70 |
| | | m13 | 0 | 5 | 8 | 2 | 8 | 5 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 5 | 8 | 8 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 2 | 57 |
| Trend I I Start | | In14" | 5 | 0 | 8 | 5 | 5 | 8 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 8 | 5 | 8 | 0 | 8 | 60 |

Figure 14: Phase 5: Obtain Detailed Results



Figure 15: Phase 5 (continued): Obtain Executive Results



3 Discussion

3.1 General

The following section attempts to widen the study's point of view through a discussion centered on: (1) a comparison with other studies and (2) limitations concerning the introduced process.

3.2 Comparison With Other Studies

Many authors investigate business cases for outsourcing. Due to very different assumptions in these studies, an exact comparison is not possible at this time. However, a preliminary comparison is attempted in order to enlarge the basis of discussion for make-or-buy decision models and/or processes. Several models are drawn in the economic literature to distinguish between activities that can be outsourced and those that should be made in-house by the buyer based on multiple criteria. Some of the models sorted by year of publication are listed below:

- The Tullock (1980) model, based on rent-seeking, allows one to determine the transaction costs of outsourcing, but does not produce a trade-off between outsourcing and vertical integration.
- The Venkatesan (1992) model indicates that there are either core products that should be strictly produced in house or non-core products that should be strictly produced with the help of suppliers. The weakness of this model is its neglect of the intermediate types of

products (from core to non-core) and thus, the corresponding recommendations.

- The Quinn and Hilmer (1995) model is based on the dimensions "degree of strategic vulnerability" and "potential for competitive advantage." This model covers three conditions of make-or-buy (inhouse production, partnership and buy-off-the-shelf). The authors only analyze some possibilities out of a total of nine.
- The Olsen and Ellram (1997) model specializes in the partnership condition and distinguishes between strategic products (important, but difficult to manage), bottleneck products (not important and difficult to manage) and leverage products (important and easy to manage). In-house production and buy-off-the-shelf are not considered.
- The Clemons and Hitt (1997) model is based on the concept of a "keeper." An activity should be considered "a keeper" if its loss, should it occur, would entail high costs or even destroy the company. Clemons and Hitt argue that the traditional characterization of "core" is of little use in assessing what can be outsourced. Instead they propose the formation of the following four groups: (1) Strategic Competence: an activity that represents a keeper and a competence that should not be outsourced. (2) Strategic Incompetence: an activity that represents a keeper, but is poorly performed internally should not be outsourced. Outsourcing would initially offer benefits, but the potential losses of outsourcing will dominate any short-term gains. Instead, these incompetence activities should be improved. (3) Non-strategic Competence: an activity that represents a non-keeper,

but is a company's competence and can be outsourced or become a business unit. (4) Non-strategic incompetence: an activity that represents a non-keeper and an incompetence that should be outsourced. Outsourcing offers opportunities for performance improvement with moderate risks.

The Levin and Tadelis (2005) model distinguishes between various contract forms that range from employment, and thus vertical integration, to outsourcing types. This model's feature is to investigate the make-or-buy decision from the point of contracts.

In an enhancement to existing models, the process developed in the present study covers the entire spectrum of make-or-buy decisions (the continuum from in-house to buy-off-the-shelf). The economic environment is held fixed for analyzing alternative structures individually, and finally compared to one another, while the existing models are isolated, as they do not take into consideration the parameters developed by one another.

3.3 Limitations

Extant make-or-buy related studies are quite voluminous. Thus, complete implementation of this literature into the make-or-buy decisionsupporting process is beyond the scope of the present study. Rather, I limit my discussions and investigations on those studies that I found to have significant influence on make-or-buy decisions, especially for managers. However, I find that many extant studies suffer from measurement problems, such as follows:

- Some factors, such as motivational, cultural and social factors are hard to handle, but may strongly influence decisions.
- Several studies examine only one factor that is predicted to affect the make-or-buy decision, holding other factors constant, whereas it is often a combination of such factors that should be assessed (Lafontaine & Slade, 2007).
- While it is easy to determine external transaction costs (buyer to supplier) but difficult to identify internal transaction costs (department to department), many results of trade-off studies are unjustified, biased in favor of vertical integration. However, those companies who conduct extensive outsourcing may have too many suppliers. This would be more costly to manage than less efficient inhouse operations, as argued by Blaxill and Hout (1991).
- Companies from different countries generally apply divergent success criteria because of unique cultures (Yan & Zeng, 1999). In addition, each culture has specific cultural codes, e.g., the trust-based cooperative norms of Japanese society encourage high collaboration rates among companies (Todeva & Knoke, 2005). Thus, assessing international scenarios is especially complicated because results are biased by different cultural environments.
- A challenge exists whether to use objective outcome indicators (e.g., financial gains, number of innovations, revenue), subjective indica-

tors (e.g., partner satisfaction with the collaboration, customer service, corporate identity) or both, in order to fully assess the performance of organizations.

In the case of the make-or-buy decision-supporting process, some of the propositions overlap each other partly or one proposition may be a sub-proposition of another (e.g., proposition "Out11 Reduce labor costs" is to a great extent a sub-proposition of proposition "Out17 Reduce production costs"). Avoiding this fact would result in garbling of the modules. Instead, double counting of similar advantages is avoided in the present study by carefully assigning values to each proposition (e.g., the benefit value of proposition "Out17 Reduce production costs" excludes the benefit of low labor costs, as this item is represented by proposition "Out11 Reduce labor costs").

Thus, the precision of propositions is limited. Yet, I assume that a preponderance of indication, gathered across plentiful studies of diverse industries, time periods and geographic regions using different approaches, yields convincing evidence as to the validity of the introduced make-or-buy decision-supporting process.

4 Conclusion

The main outcome of this study is the development of a make-or-buy decision-supporting process. A structured application procedure makes this process attractive to any manager who needs a simple and transparent tool to support make-or-buy decisions. Dividing the make-or-buy question into many sub-questions based on, in this case, 16 objectives and characteristics, helps decision-makers generate a transparent and strategy-oriented solution with fair attention to all important considerations.

By contrast, the less structured intuitive approach allows the decision-maker to weigh only a few arguments/propositions simultaneously – typically those which have current subjective importance for the decider, e.g., bad news about Dollar/Euro currency trends, which would favor an outsourcing decision or bad news about risk of revealing know-how, which would favor an integration decision.



As closing thought, I have concluded that economic motivational goals, political hurdles and technical challenges should be more closely merged in the early phases of strategic decision-making for any new, large-scale program in organizations. By doing so, decision-makers can adapt the organizational architecture to the needs of any planned big program, resulting in an important aspect of efficiency improvements. In addition, the process may be extended to more macro or micro strategic make-or-buy themes as shown in Figure 16. The next step, which is beyond the scope of the present study, is an empirical validation of the tool in the form of interviews with experts, economists and politicians.

Note

The views reported in this paper are those of me alone, and not those of any institution. All errors and omissions, which may unwittingly remain are the sole responsibility of me.

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